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Abstract 
High crime rates among second-generation immigrants are usually attributed to the ethnic group’s 
weak socio-economic position in the host society. The causes of crime can however also be sought in 
their native countries or regions. Due to a lack of empirical data, this has rarely been tested. The 
Netherlands is an exception: small-scale ethnographic case studies among young Moroccan men in 
Dutch cities suggest that their regional background and culture, particularly if they are from the less 
developed Rif mountain area, may explain their high crime rates. In this article we examine whether 
this applies to the results of a quantitative study on all the Moroccan male juveniles in the Netherlands. 
At the individual level, our unique dataset is a combination of their native regions, criminal records 
(ever suspected of a crime), and demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Logistic regression 
analysis shows that current socio-economic position is a strong predictor of ever having been 
suspected of a criminal offence, and the impact of geographic descent, directly or indirectly via socio-
economic position in the Netherlands, is negligible. Accordingly, our findings on Moroccans in the 
Netherlands do not warrant our questioning the common explanation of the immigrant-crime 
connection in criminology and suggest further research to determine the specific host society’s 
features that explain the over-representation of ethnic groups in crime statistics.  
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Introduction 
 
It has now been fifty years since the first Moroccan men came to the Netherlands as guest 
workers or labour migrants. Especially after the oil crisis of 1973 and the economic recession 
of the early 1980s, approximately half of them had their families come as well, starting with 
the Moroccan immigrant community, which, according to Statistics Netherlands, now (1 
January 2014) consists of 374,694 people. A first generation, a 1.5 generation that grew up 
partly in Morocco and then in the Netherlands, and a second generation of Moroccan-Dutch 
persons can now be distinguished. Although the majority has Dutch or dual citizenship 
(Loozen et al. 2012: 37), it is still common practice in the Netherlands to label all generations 
as Moroccans. About two-thirds come from (a) the Rif mountain region along the north coast, 
(b) the south in the area around Agadir (Souss) and Ouarzazate, and (c) the cities of Tangiers, 
Casablanca, Fes, Meknes, Marrakech and Rabat. In the Netherlands, most Moroccans live in 
the four large cities of the Randstad conurbation: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and 
Utrecht (Fokkema et al. 2009). 
 Ever since the early 1990s, young men from this group are believed to have posed a 
persistent crime problem that not only includes disturbing the peace and vandalism but also 
high-impact offences such as mugging, burglary and armed robbery. More than half the 1.5 
and second generation of young Moroccan men have been charged by the police with one or 
more criminal offences of varying severity by the time they are 23 (Blokland et al. 2010). 
Figures of the 2011 Integration Report of the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (van 
Noije and Kessels 2012: 207) are as high as 65% – striking because the first generation of 
immigrants had a below-average crime rate. 
 It initially seemed as if the high figures could be explained by an over-representation 
of young Moroccan men in the lower socio-economic segments of society. But as far back as 
1990, Junger notes on the basis of self-reported data that Moroccan crime rates for this age 
group are significantly higher than the average in the lowest socio-economic segments of 
society and those of other minorities. Based on Dutch Police Department suspect figures 
(HKS: Herkenningsdienstsysteem, Police Identification Service System) for 2009, researchers 
at the Netherlands Institute for Social Research calculated the extent to which general risk 
factors (sex, age, educational level, income, urbanisation) determine the level of over-
representation of various groups of non-Western youths. It was lowest in the case of 
Moroccans (van Noije and Kessels 2012: 214-215). A second plausible explanation is that 
Moroccans’ over-representation in crime statistics is the result of selective policing and 
discrimination. Recently there has been a heated discussion on the issue of ethnic profiling by 
the Dutch police. The results of empirical research are not conclusive so far (Bovenkerk 2014, 
Cankaya 2012, Svensson and Saharso 2014). However, as Junger-Tas argued about the 
exceptional rise of Moroccan crime rates that began to appear in the 1990s: ‘Even if the police 
is prejudiced this would not explain the disparities in crime rates between various minorities. 
Why would the police discriminate Moroccans more than other ethnic groups?’ (Junger-Tas 
1997: 283). 
 Dutch ethnic studies researchers often make references to Moroccans’ regional 
background and culture. High delinquency rates are assumed to be the result of (1) the 
primitive conditions in the rural regions most of the immigrants come from and (2) the Berber 
culture of the Rif Mountains in the north, with its resistance towards the central government, 
where approximately two thirds of them are from. Such notions are based mainly upon small-
scale ethnographic fieldwork among groups of problematic young Moroccan men in large 
Dutch cities (van Gemert 1998; Werdmölder 1997), pedagogical research in Moroccan 
families, and psychological studies of individual criminals in the Netherlands (Brons et al. 
2008). How do such insights fit into the theories on crime and immigration, and – this is the 
core of this article – do they stand up to a quantitative test: to what extent can differences in 
crime rates among young Moroccan men be attributed to their regional descent? This question 
is answered by comparing Dutch criminal records (ever suspected of a crime) of young 
Moroccan men who have a background in the countryside respectively the Rif with those who 
originate in cities respectively other parts of Morocco. 
 
 
Immigration and crime 
 
Concerns about crime among immigrants have a long history and have often been fed by anti-
immigration and xenophobic sentiments. Newcomers were expected to compete unfairly on 
the labour market, deplete welfare resources, cause housing shortages and create other social 
problems. However, assumptions that crime rates of first-generation immigrants are higher 
than average have been consistently contradicted by scientific research that shows lower 
crime rates instead. Such findings on immigrant crime in 1920s America by Chicago 
sociologists (Park et al. 1967) were confirmed in Europe by Ferracuti, who wrote a 
comprehensive work on the topic in 1968. In 1996, Yeager once again corroborated this 
‘general rule’ in a meta-analysis that also included experiences in Canada and Australia. For 
violent crime, Robert J. Sampson has shown that in the US ‘cities of concentrated 
immigration are some of the safest places around’ (Sampson 2008: 30). These findings have 
served as an important argument against those wanting to stop immigration on the grounds of 
fear. But it was also noted that immigrants ‘import’ their countries’ crime traditions to a 
certain extent. For example, first-generation southern Italians were relatively likely to commit 
homicides and Finns more apt to commit crimes directly related to excessive drinking 
(Sutherland 1939: 125). Moreover, the crime rates for many second-generation immigrants 
born in the new land were found to be higher than average for their age group, while rates for 
the 1.5 generation of immigrant boys (with a cut-off generally set at an immigration age of 12; 
Rumbaut 2004) lie somewhere in-between. 
 
 
Host country influences 
 
In the last two decades, empirical study of the possible link between immigration and crime 
has been in full swing (Bucerius and Tonry 2014; Marshall-Haen 1997; Solivetti 2010; Tonry 
1997), and second-generation immigrant crime has become a topic of scientific interest on its 
own right (Waters 1999). So far, most sociological studies in search for the causes of an 
immigrant crime problem have confined themselves to analysing data on the social, economic 
and cultural developments of immigrant groups in the host country. The theories of social 
integration and acculturation roughly predict that in the long run crime among successive 
generations of immigrants will come to resemble the crime rate and profile of society at large 
(Junger-Tas 2001). The level of delinquency of each immigrant community will vary 
according to the levels of structural and cultural integration of the group. This viewpoint does 
not account for the specific crime problems of the first and 1.5 generations, and the second-
generation crime problem needs a more refined explanation. At least three other strands of 
sociological theory that address the second-generation crime problem in particular – social 
disorganisation, cultural dissonance and strain theory – with roots in sociology work of 1920s 
Chicago, satisfy this need and in the process inspire contemporary empirical study on the 
subject (Simes and Waters 2014: 460-461; Thomas 2011). 
 Social disorganisation theory (Shaw and McKay 1942) argues that an absence of 
social cohesion and normative consensus leads to crime. This theory has served to explain the 
patterns of high crime rates in areas that Chicagoans called zones of transition – poor city 
neighbourhoods where immigrant children grew up under conditions of economic deprivation, 
physical deterioration and high resident turnover. The heterogeneity and transience of the 
population in these areas made it particularly difficult to organise the neighbourhood and 
supervise children. At the same time, Chicagoans did see that some groups exhibited greater 
social disorganisation than others, even if their socio-economic status was the same. The 
Chicago researchers explained this by noting that groups could escape from disorganisation 
by preserving their social cohesion or forming a ‘colony’ or ‘ghetto’ (Park et al. 1967: 107). 
Aronowitz (2002) uses this notion in order to explain the effectiveness of social control of 
juvenile delinquents in the Turkish community of Berlin today. Within their own circle in 
Germany, for a while, people were able to preserve their traditional mechanisms of social 
control. She finds that crime rates among the second generation born in Germany is higher 
than those of youngsters who were born and educated in Turkey and brought to Berlin as 
children (i.e. what we call the 1.5 generation).  
 A second line of theory-building would later be called relative deprivation or strain 
theory (Merton 1949). Strain theorists of Chicago argued that the parents’ generation was 
satisfied with simple jobs and a low income in the host country because they compared them 
with the economic and political conditions in their native country. However, the second 
generation compared themselves at school and on the street with Americans and had higher 
material demands, which led to strain and possibly to crime. We have found no references to 
the 1.5 generation among strain theorists. 
 The theory of cultural conflict or cultural dissonance (Sellin 1938) focuses on the 
immigrant experience of people being thrust into a milieu in which cultures and ‘conduct 
norms’ clash, particularly when rural immigrants find themselves in a cosmopolitan city 
setting. The first generation of immigrants may live in the culture in which they have been 
brought up in the country of origin. The second generation suffers most from the conflict of 
cultures. Children of immigrants are vulnerable when they find themselves in the no-man’s 
land between two cultures. They may have been neither able to internalise the culture of their 
parents or to integrate into the new society. The 1.5 generation takes an intermediate position. 
Shoham (1962: 212) specified this theory by pointing at the possibility that the economic 
status of the head of the family will often be ‘injured’ in the process of integration. This 
leaves youngsters in a state of confusion that pushes them into the ‘street culture’ to become 
juvenile delinquents.  
 
Effects of the country of origin 
 
Surprisingly, none of these three theories has paid explicit attention to the specific social, 
cultural or political backgrounds the immigrants had in their country of origin. The link 
between immigrants’ origin and crime in the theory of social disorganisation is indirect and 
unspecified: the mere fact that immigrants settle in poor neighbourhoods that are in a 
continuous state of demographic flux results in social disorganisation. This in turn increases 
the crime rate. The motor of criminality in the strain theory lies in the attraction of ‘success 
goals’ of affluent American society and the lack of legitimate means to attain them. A lack of 
education or experience working in modern industrial conditions absent in the country of 
origin are not explicitly taken into account. Cultural conflict theory looks for differences in 
norms and values but does not involve a full examination of the cultural and economic 
geography of the country of origin. This negligence of interest in the country of immigrant 
origins also holds true for the deviant street subcultures that have developed among the 
second generation. Take for example the famous ethnography by William Foote Whyte’s 
Street Corner Society (1943) in Boston. The fact that the parents of the Corner boys were of 
Italian descent (more precisely they came from the hills of Avellino near Naples) is almost 
completely ignored.1  
 Probably as a consequence, criminologists and other social scientists have rarely 
looked at the country of origin. More recently, however, an increasing recognition of the role 
of the home country is noticeable. In his theoretical frameworks for theory and research about 
the immigrant-crime nexus, Mears encourages us explicitly to take background variables in 
the country of emigration and subpopulations within the immigrant flow into account (Mears 
2001:10). Thomas finds a delinquent’s background relevant as immigrants enter the new 
country with ‘tremendously varied experiences in their home countries, communities, family, 
and friendship networks’ (Thomas 2011: 384).  
 Dutch researchers are an exception in this respect. In the Dutch tradition of cultural 
geography and ethnography, researchers have long included immigrants’ backgrounds when 
describing and analysing their social problems. They have conducted fieldwork in the 
countries of emigration (e.g. Suriname, the Netherlands Antilles, Turkey, Morocco), and more 
precisely in the regions where immigrants predominantly have come from (van Amersfoort 
1982). In Morocco they studied the varying levels of social capital among the sending 
population (De Mas 1987) and the family history of the emigrants (van den Berg-Eldering 
1978). From the moment that Dutch social scientists began studying crime and delinquency 
                                                          
1 In her biting criticism of Whyte’s Boston ethnography, Boelen (1992), who had lived in Southern Italy, writes 
that second-generation Italian boys’ group behaviour was similar to what she had observed in Campania. 
among immigrant groups (around 1990), they explicitly included in their analyses variables 
pertaining to conditions in the countries of origin (e.g. van Gemert, 1998 and Werdmölder, 
1997 in Morocco).  
 In the years of Moroccan family reunification in the Netherlands, Dutch researchers 
discussed the possible causes of crime problems in the 1.5 generation. Did the criminality of 
young migrants start before the move or after they settled in the Netherlands? Werdmölder 
(1997) and van den Berg-Eldering (1978) show that youngsters who arrived in the 
Netherlands as the 1.5 generation were already engaged in criminal activities or juvenile 
delinquency in Morocco. This has to do with the Moroccan way of bringing up children, 
especially in the Berber region of the Rif. Young children are brought up by their mother, but 
starting at the age of eight the father is responsible. Boys become part of the men’s world and 
spend a lot of time outside the home. They spend time at school, on the street and at the 
market. As their fathers are in Europe, there is no one to discipline and correct them. For 
mothers, the risk of losing their grip on their sons and having them ‘go bad’ was an important 
reason to insist on family reunification in Europe. Social control, to the extent that it still 
existed in Morocco, decreased further in the Netherlands. 
 More in general, Moroccan crime in the Netherlands is often explained by the fact that 
most of these immigrants originate from an underdeveloped countryside and from the 
northern Rif area, which has a reputation for ‘rough individualism’ and political 
rebelliousness. Dutch researchers’ descriptions of the major regions of Moroccans’ 
provenance have found their way to a larger public, and their argument that Moroccan’s over-
representation in crime statistics is attributable to the specificities of these regions is now 
considered as ‘social fact’ that is disseminated in universities and in special courses on 
minorities for law-enforcement personnel. Specialists comment in the media on conspicuous 
incidents of crime that involve persons with an immigration background from the north of 
Morocco. The theme is often discussed among ‘Moroccan’ intellectuals in the Netherlands 
(e.g. in the novel Bad boy by Abdelkader Benali). Police officers, attorneys and local 
authorities make ‘discovery trips’ to the Rif area in order to gain insight into the background 
of the problem.  
 
Expected differences in Moroccan crime by regional origin 
 
The ‘social fact’ that the rural and Rif background of the majority of Moroccan immigrants to 
the Netherlands is largely responsible for their high crime rates, implicitly or explicitly 
assumes differences in crime rates by regional descent. The assumption goes that if the 
migration from Morocco to the Netherlands were less selective, with more people from cities 
and modern regions than the Rif area, there would be less of a Moroccan crime problem. 
Although there are plausible arguments for this notion, to our knowledge it has never been 
directly studied or quantitatively tested prior to this study. 
 
Rural versus urban. Given the sociological theories of immigration described above, it is 
only logical to assume that the more the native region and host country differ socio-
economically and in terms of modernity, the greater the gap and the longer it takes to 
integrate. For example, immigrants from a close-knit community in the poor countryside who 
have not had much education have more trouble transitioning to an anonymous urban 
environment than well-educated urbanites. Eisenstadt followed this line of reasoning when he 
explained the high crime rates among Sephardic Jews (Moroccans!) in Israel as follows: ‘The 
disorganisation of the immigrant group, instability of social relations, and of various types of 
norm-breaking, juvenile delinquency, crime etc. is strongest among those groups whose 
cultural and educational standards are much lower than those of the absorbing society’ 
(Eisenstadt 1954: 261). Similarly, Junger-Tas (1997: 300-301), who has been the advocate of 
integration theory in the Netherlands, explains high crime rates among immigrant minorities 
through their weak socio-economic position that results from a considerable ‘culture lag’ with 
respect to the home country. She specified the cultural dimension of the conflict of cultures. 
There were differences between values such as traditionalism versus modernism, respect for 
authority versus democratic decision-making, etc. (Junger-Tas 2001: 23). 
 The conditions for explaining crime through differences in economic development and 
culture between the Moroccan countryside and urban Netherlands seem fulfilled. The socio-
economic and cultural distance from the Moroccan countryside to Dutch urban society is 
huge. Two-thirds of all immigrants came from rural areas, and here we include the smaller 
towns Al Hoceima and Nador. Bouras (2012: 52) notes in her history of Moroccans in the 
Netherlands that people from the countryside had much larger families than those from the 
cities, and had to make much more of a transition from their traditional lifestyle to settle in the 
Netherlands. The literature on Moroccan emigration gives examples of illiterate women who 
had their first experience with city life when they came to Europe and had a very hard time 
coping with modernity. How were they supposed to raise their children in this environment? 
Pels and de Haan (2007) write about parents facing child-rearing uncertainty. Moroccan 
fathers were also all too aware that the contrast between the old and new cultures could lead 
to behavioural problems on the part of their children. They could foresee that their children 
would be exposed to the ‘depravity of the West’, which is why they resisted the idea of family 
reunification for such a long time (Eldering 1995). 
 If the socio-economic and cultural distance is what determines how hard it is to bridge 
the gap, Moroccans from the countryside might be expected to be more apt to develop 
criminal behaviour than those from the cities. This would particularly hold for the second 
generation and, to a lesser extent, the 1.5 generation, given their higher likelihood to suffer 
from conflict of cultures and their higher material demands. Accordingly, the following 
hypotheses can be formulated: 
H1a. Crime rates in the Netherlands are higher among Moroccans who come from the 
countryside or whose parents do than among those who come from Moroccan cities or 
whose parents do. 
H1b. The rural-urban difference in criminality is largest among the second generation and 
smallest among the first, with the 1.5 generation occupying an intermediate position. 
H1c. The rural-urban difference in criminality decreases after correcting for differences in 
socio-economic situation in the Netherlands. 
 
Rif versus the rest. Apart from the rurality of the Rif Mountains, the level of development of 
this area has been notoriously low (De Mas 1987). Using the concept of social capital, De 
Mas (1987) explains the contrast in regional mentality, entrepreneurship and extent of 
integration in the national state between the southern Souss and the northern Rif Mountains in 
Morocco. There are geographic and historical reasons why the Rif fell behind in the 
development process (De Mas 2001). With its steep cliffs on the coasts, for those in power the 
Rif was always a buffer zone against invasions from the north instead of an integral part of the 
country. Until recently, the Rif was the poorest part of the country. Between 1912 and 1956, 
when Morocco was colonised by the French, the Rif was Spanish and remained 
underdeveloped. Its inhabitants speak one of the Berber languages, Spanish and Moroccan 
Arabic, but not French. The region was originally a tribal society, but was administered by 
Arab officials and not Berbers. After independence, King Hassan II developed a hostile 
relationship with his subjects in the region by violently suppressing the rebellions in 1958–
1959. In ethnography the social structure of the Rif tribes is described as weak, and families 
distrust each other (Hart 2000). There is hardly a level of social or political control above the 
level of individual families. When the father is absent because he works overseas as a 
migratory worker, his sons grow up in relative freedom. This accounts for the deviance of the 
1.5 generation. The second generation grows up in Europe, where the patriarch of the family 
has lost much of his control over his children. It is difficult to exert corrective social control 
over the younger generation in a group where social cohesion is low and where families 
distrust each other. The following hypotheses can be formulated: 
H2a. Crime rates in the Netherlands are higher among Moroccans who are from the Rif or 
whose parents are than among those who are from elsewhere in Morocco or whose 
parents are. 
H2b. The Rif-elsewhere difference in criminality is largest among the second generation and 
smallest among the first, with the 1.5 generation occupying an intermediate position. 
H2c. The Rif-elsewhere difference in criminality decreases after correcting for differences in 
socio-economic situation in the Netherlands. 
 
 
 
Research design: data and methods 
 
Data 
 
The analyses were conducted using data from the System of social statistical datasets (SSD) 
at Statistics Netherlands, which contains virtually integral data about the population of the 
Netherlands in a system of linkable registers and surveys that have been merged and made 
consistent (see Bakker et al. 2014). It has data on demography, education, the labour market, 
criminality and so forth. The criminality data in the SSD are from the HKS 
(Herkenningsdienstsysteem, Police Identification Service System) that covers the entire 
country and has been in use since 1986 to register anyone suspected of a criminal offence. 
The region first- and second-generation immigrants come from is not standard information in 
the SSD. This study, however, could benefit from the findings of a project classifying the 
native regions and provinces of first- and second-generation Moroccans residing in the 
Netherlands on 1 January 2009 (Fokkema et al. 2009). The mother’s origin is chosen to assess 
the second generation whose parents both come from Morocco. Personal identifiers are used 
to link the information of various registers and surveys relevant to our study. For privacy 
protection purposes, in order to preclude direct identification of persons these personal 
identifiers are replaced by anonymous linkage keys. Moreover, generation of the required 
dataset as well as the analyses are done at Statistics Netherlands, which under adequate 
technical and organisational measures is authorised by law to use administrative data from all 
government institutions for statistical and scientific purposes.  
 The study focuses on men of Moroccan descent in the 15–25 age group living in the 
Netherlands at the beginning of 2009 and on the reference date of 24 September 2010.2,3 The 
research population includes a total of 32,400 Moroccan men in the 15–25 age group. The 
study is restricted to Moroccan men because the percentage of Moroccan male suspects is 
more than five times higher than that of Moroccan female suspects (Jennissen and Besjes 
2012: 176-177). We restrict our study to the 15–25 age group because the percentages of 
suspects are much higher in this age category of the Moroccan population than in any other 
cohort (Jennissen and Besjes 2012: 177). 
                                                          
2 When referring to men of Moroccan descent in this article, we mean men born in Morocco with at least one 
parent also born abroad (the first generation) as well as men born in the Netherlands but whose mother was born 
in Morocco or, if the mother was born in the Netherlands, whose father was born in Morocco (the second 
generation). For the sake of readability and conciseness, the research group is regularly referred to according to 
the descent classification, i.e. Moroccan men, Moroccans or Moroccan. This is always a definition of descent 
and not of nationality.  
3 The selection date of 24 September 2010 is also the reference date for the demographic and socio-economic 
features (stock data) of the research target group. The criminality data are of a somewhat later date, i.e. 31 
December 2010. The additional requirement that the members of the group in question also had to have been 
living in the Netherlands at the beginning of 2009 has to do with the fact that we know the native region and 
province for most of them.  
 Measuring instruments 
 
The dependent variable is whether someone has ever been a suspect, i.e. has been suspected 
of a criminal offence at least once before the reference date of 31 December 2010. One should 
bear in mind that the most recent time that a person has been a suspect may have been long 
before the reference date. The data pertain to people suspected of a crime by the police and 
not to those who have been convicted. However, more than an estimated 90% of youngsters 
suspected of a criminal offence accept a deal with the Prosecutor’s Office or are sentenced 
and convicted by the Court at a later stage (Jennissen and Blom 2007: 56/57). The suspected 
crimes vary from offenses against public decency, violent offences and drug offences to 
traffic and property offences and violations of public order. 
 The independent variable we are interested in is the geographic descent of the 
Moroccans. In the study by Fokkema et al. (2009) referred to above, the place of birth of 
Moroccan residents of the Netherlands is coded into 16 administrative regions and 61 
administrative provinces within these regions (see Figure 1). The native region and province 
in Morocco could be determined for more than 95% of them. For the Moroccan men aged 15–
25 in our research dataset, the percentage with an unknown native region and province is 2. 
To test Hypothesis 1a, a distinction is drawn between the provinces with Casablanca, Fes, 
Marrakech, Meknes, Ouarzazate, Rabat, Tangiers and Tetouan as the main cities and the rural 
regions. To test Hypothesis 2a, a distinction is drawn between the Rif region, i.e. the 
provinces Al Hoceima and Nador, and Other, i.e. the other 59 provinces. Moroccans with a 
migration background from the urban provinces or outside the Rif constitute the reference 
group. It is important to note that the Rif region does not fit perfectly with the administrative 
provinces Al Hoceima and Nador – the upper part of the Taounate and Taza provinces is 
actually part of the Rif Mountains (see Figure 2). 
 
< Figures 1 and 2 about here > 
 
The following variables are used in the study to check for possible differences in the 
demographic composition of the various native regions: age, position in the household and 
level of urbanisation of the current place of residence (for the distinct categories of the two 
latter variables, see Table 1). To test whether there is evidence of a non-linear relation for age, 
its square is also included in the analysis. 
 Three generations are distinguished to test Hypotheses 1b and 2b: the first generation 
(the reference group), the 1.5 generation and the second generation. The 1.5 generation 
includes the first generation that came to the Netherlands at a young age and was largely 
raised and educated there. In this article, an immigration age of 12 is taken as cut-off point. 
 Lastly, three socio-economic status indicators are included in the analysis to test 
Hypotheses 1c and 2c: educational level, disposable household income and main source of 
income (for the distinct categories of the socio-economic variables, see Table 1). Given the 
age of the research group, educational level refers to the highest grade of school attended 
instead of the highest diploma. The disposable household income pertains to the joint gross 
income of all the household members (excluding insurance premiums, taxes and paid income 
transfers such as alimony), and is standardised by dividing it by an equivalence factor.4 The 
                                                          
4 The equivalence factor reflects the scale advantages that result from keeping a joint household. Use is made of 
the Statistics Netherlands equivalence scale with a single-person household taken as the standard household with 
factor 1. For each following person above the age of 18, the equivalence scale adds a factor of 0.37. Depending 
on the ranking in the household, this is an added factor of 0.15–0.33 for children below the age of 18. A single 
person with an income of 10,000 euros would thus be at the same prosperity level as a childless couple with an 
income of 13,700 euros (standardised as 10,000 euros).  
15–25-year-old Moroccan men’s households with known annual disposable household 
incomes are presented in 25% groups of the income distribution.5  
 The reference date for stock data such as socio-economic status and age is 24 
September 2010. The flow data such as annual disposable household income pertain to the 
year 2010. 
 
< Table 1 about here > 
 
 
 
 
Results 
 
Using logistic regression analysis, we calculate the net effect of Moroccan geographic descent 
on having ever been suspected of a criminal offence. The results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. 
Model 1 only includes geographic descent in the analysis. Moroccans in the 15–25 age group 
who come from the countryside and the Rif, or whose parents do, are more likely to have been 
suspected of a criminal offence than those who come from a city or from outside the Rif or 
whose parents do. To exclude the possibility of these descent differences being caused by 
demographic composition differences, Model 2 is corrected for three demographic 
characteristics that prior research has shown to exert an influence on criminal conduct: age, 
position in the household and urbanisation level of the current place of residence. There is an 
inverted U-shaped correlation between age and criminality in that the likelihood of having 
been suspected of a criminal offence at some point increases with age and then starts 
decreasing after the age of about 22. Moroccans (not parents) in the 15–25 age group in a 
two-parent household are less likely to have been suspected of a criminal offence than those 
in a different type of household, with the exception of those cohabiting without children. The 
negative correlation between criminality and urbanisation level of the current place of 
residence is somewhat striking. The most important finding in Model 2, however, is that after 
this correction the descent differences are even slightly greater. Hypotheses 1a and 2a are thus 
confirmed. Crime rates in the Netherlands are higher among Moroccans who come from the 
countryside and the Rif or whose parents do than among those who come from the urban 
provinces in Morocco and from outside the Rif or whose parents do. 
 The influence of descent on criminality should be put into the proper perspective. 
Differences in geographic descent may be significant but they are small. After controlling for 
the three demographic characteristics, the likelihood of having been suspected of a criminal 
offence is 1.138 greater for 15–25-year-old Moroccans with a rural background and 1.106 
greater for those with roots in the Rif. This limited influence of geographic descent on the 
likelihood of having been suspected of a criminal offence also manifests itself in the low-
percentage variance explained by this variable, i.e. the explained variance is no more than 
0.1% (see Model 1). Because of the large size of the research population, this limited effect is 
nonetheless significant. 
 In Model 3, generation is added as a main effect and in Model 4, to test Hypotheses 1b 
and 2b, also as an interaction effect with geographic descent. There is a significant difference 
between the first generation and the 1.5 and second generations. Young men who were born 
in the Netherlands or came to live there before they were 12 have a substantially greater 
chance of having been suspected of a criminal offence than those who spent their entire youth 
in Morocco. Adding the generation increases the explained variance by 0.3 percentage points. 
The generation difference is unrelated to geographic descent though; none of the interaction 
                                                          
5 The cut-offs of the 25% groups of the standardised annual disposable household incomes are: 11,877, 15,209 
and 20,135 euros.  
effects are significant. Hypotheses 1b and 2b thus fail to be confirmed. Regardless of the 
generation, Moroccans from the countryside and the Rif are somewhat more likely to have 
been suspected of a criminal offence. 
 To test Hypotheses 1c and 2c, i.e. that geographic descent differences manifest 
themselves in socio-economic differences in the Netherlands, several socio-economic 
characteristics were added to the last model. Socio-economic position is an extremely 
important predictor of having ever been suspected of a criminal offence, as is witnessed by the 
sharp rise from 12% in the explained part of the variance. The higher the educational, income 
and employment levels, the lower the likelihood of having been suspected of a criminal 
offence. Geographic descent differences are smaller after correcting for socio-economic 
differences, though they remain significant. Hence Hypotheses 1c and 2c fail to be confirmed, 
and the fact that Moroccans with a rural and Rif background are more likely to have been 
suspected of a criminal offence is not related to a socio-economically disadvantaged position 
in the Netherlands. 
 
< Tables 2 and 3 about here > 
 
As noted in the research design, the provinces of Al Hoceima and Nador do not include all of 
the Rif region. An extra analysis has been added to also compare the two provinces to the 
south of the Rif – Taounate and Taza – to provinces elsewhere in Morocco. The analyses 
show that Moroccans who come from these provinces or whose parents do are especially 
likely to have been suspected of a criminal offence (results not presented). Here too the 
effects are significantly yet small. A second supplementary analysis compares the provinces 
of Al Hoceima and Nador to the other provinces. No significant difference emerges as to a 
greater likelihood of having been suspected of a criminal offence (results not presented). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this study is to address an important question in the migration sociology of 
criminality. Unlike the first immigrant generation, the second generation is often characterised 
by high crime rates. The 1.5 generation occupies a position in the middle. Is the cause of the 
problem the present socio-economic and cultural position of the immigrant group in the host 
country, or does it have more to do with conditions in the native country? Without further 
argumentation, migration sociologists generally choose the first option. Many scholars of 
crime among immigrants in the Netherlands have chosen the second option. 
 Moroccan criminality in the Netherlands gives us an opportunity to test the second 
option. Statistics Netherlands has data on the demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics, suspected crimes and regional descent of first-generation Moroccans and their 
children in the Netherlands. This enables us to examine the extent to which young Moroccan 
men’s likelihood of having been suspected of a criminal offence varies in accordance with 
their regional descent or that of their parents. In this contribution we have tested the often-
made assumptions in the Netherlands that a rural background of the immigrant group and the 
specific regional background of the Rif area account for high crime rates of 1.5- and second-
generation young men.  
 The analyses show differences in crime rates by regional origin: immigrants from rural 
Morocco are more likely to have been suspected of a crime offence in the Netherlands, and so 
are immigrants from the formerly neglected and politically rebellious Rif Mountain region. 
Statistical significance, however, is not equivalent to scientific importance. The explanatory 
power of the regional difference is no higher than 0.1%, which is far less than one might 
expect based on the scholarly and policy-related literature. That a significant correlation 
between regional descent and criminality is nonetheless observed has to do with the large size 
of the research population. 
 Socio-economic status in the Netherlands exerts a considerably greater explanatory 
power, and there is only partial evidence that regional descent differences in Morocco 
manifest themselves in current socio-economic differences. Unemployment, a low educational 
level and a low income are much better predictors of having ever been suspected of a criminal 
offence than geographic descent. The findings encourage us to seek the causes of Moroccan 
criminality in the Netherlands rather than Morocco. There is also a difference between the 
criminality of the 1.5 and the first generation: regardless of their regional descent, children 
who arrived in the Netherlands at an early age are clearly more likely to have been suspected 
of a criminal offence than children who spent their entire youth in Morocco. 
 The conclusion is that if we take a closer look, Moroccan criminality is a general 
phenomenon in the Netherlands and not the result of the rural or Rif background of many 
immigrants. Considering the expectation aroused in the literature about the regional 
background of Moroccan criminality in the Netherlands, this is a rather unexpected 
conclusion. It can perhaps be explained in part by the limitations of the dataset. We lack 
access to data on internal migration that might have preceded emigration to Europe. We do 
not know how many ‘rural urbanites’, as van den Berg-Eldering (1978) calls them, are 
included in the group we categorise here as rural. This limitation is important, since male 
migrants sometimes deliberately had their families get used to life in Moroccan cities so the 
cultural transition would not be all too extreme. The result might also have been different had 
the correlation between regional descent and criminality been examined at a lower 
aggregation level. After all, a high crime rate in a region as a whole can be based upon a 
criminal tradition of one or more places. Lastly, we should also note the risk of a false causal 
interpretation of our research results if having a job and an education considerably reduce the 
risk of joining the criminal path. It is also possible that the crime rate among young men is so 
high that in itself it is a reason to not qualify for a job or education. 
 Despite these limitations, the present study demonstrates that with respect to the 
assumption about the immigrant-crime nexus, here again there is no reason to attach all too 
much significance to the possibly criminogenic background of where immigrants come from 
and their culture. In this case, we have tested the hypotheses against regional differences in 
one country. Up to now, immigrant crime rates have only been compared between native 
countries, and this leads to comparability problems. We focussed on regional differentiation 
within one country, so this methodological drawback plays much less of a role. For the time 
being, we concur with Solivetti (2010), who concludes on the grounds of a comparison 
between various immigrant groups in different immigration countries that the features of the 
host societies, more than the features of the native countries, explain more about the 
criminality within ethnic groups. 
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Figure 1. Map of Morocco* 
* Since there are no population figures available for Mdiq-Fnidq, this province is combined 
with Tetouan. 
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Figure 2. The Rif region 
 Table 1. Descriptive statistics, 15–25-year-old Moroccan men 
 
% M 
Criminality   
Ever a suspect 50.5  
Descent, level of urbanisation   
urban 29.7  
rural 68.2  
unknown 2.0  
Descent, region   
Rif 44.8  
Al Hoceima 13.9  
Nador 30.8  
non-Rif 53.2  
unknown 2.0  
Demographic characteristics   
Age  19.75 
Household position   
child or other member (not parent) of two-parent household 52.7  
child or other member (not parent) in one-parent household 14.0  
single person 17.5  
married or cohabiting, childless 4.0  
married or cohabiting, with children 1.1  
othera 10.6  
Level or urbanisation of current place of residence   
very high 53.2  
high 26.8  
moderate 14.0  
not very or not 6.0  
unknown 0.1  
Generation   
1 4.9  
1.5 11.7  
2 83.3  
Socio-economic status   
Educational level   
lowb 21.8  
mediumc 55.6  
highd 17.3  
unknown 5.3  
Standardised disposable household income   
unknown 2.4  
0–25% group 24.4  
25–50% group 24.4  
50–75% group 24.4  
75–100% group 24.4  
Main source of income   
paid job 25.2  
social benefit 7.7  
pupil/student 56.2  
othere 10.9  
a single parents, persons in institutions and homes, and several other remaining groups 
b primary school, preparatory middle-level vocational school, middle-level vocational school 1 and first half of 
five- or six-year secondary school 
c middle-level vocational school 2–4 and second half of five- or six-year secondary school 
d advanced vocational school, college, first-year university examination, Bachelor’s, Master’s and PhD 
e persons with no income or no known source of income at the reference moment, including persons receiving 
alimony, allowances from parents or income from capital 
 
Table 2. Odds ratios for ever having been suspected of a criminal offence, 15–25-year-old 
Moroccan men, rural versus urban background 
Model: 1 2 3 4 5 
Descent (ref. urban)      
rural 1.103*** 1.138*** 1.137*** 1.072 1.101*** 
unknown 0.970 0.901 0.901 0.326** 0.879 
Demographic characteristics      
Age (linear)  3.062*** 2.980*** 2.977*** 3.812*** 
Age square  0.975*** 0.976*** 0.976*** 0.972*** 
Household position (ref. child or other member 
(not parent) of two-parent household) 
     
child or other member (not parent) in one-parent 
household 
 1.298*** 1.298*** 1.297*** 1.164*** 
single  1.070* 1.077* 1.076* 1.025 
married or cohabiting, childless  1.020 1.025 1.028 1.141* 
married or cohabiting, with children  1.336** 1.339** 1.342** 1.244 
other  1.232*** 1.224*** 1.222*** 1.243*** 
Level of urbanisation of current place of residence 
(ref. not very or not) 
     
very high  0.833*** 0.844*** 0.845*** 0.870** 
high  0.889* 0.890* 0.890* 0.892* 
moderate  0.877* 0.875* 0.876* 0.878* 
unknown  1.256 1.285 1.332 0.428* 
Generation (ref. 1st)      
1.5   1.574*** 1.487*** 2.422*** 
2   1.597*** 1.496*** 2.653*** 
Generation * Descent      
1.5 * rural    1.050  
2 * rural    1.066  
1.5 * unknown    3.923**  
2 * unknown    2.885*  
Socio-economic status      
Educational level (ref. high)      
low     5.669*** 
medium     3.336*** 
unknown     2.239*** 
Standardised disposable household income (ref. 
75–100% group) 
     
0–25% group     1.738*** 
25–50% group     1.498*** 
50–75% group     1.180*** 
unknown     2.719*** 
Main source of income (ref. paid job)      
social benefit     1.514*** 
pupil/student     0.935 
other     2.441*** 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.001 0.071 0.074 0.074 0.192 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 
Table 3. Odds ratios for ever having been suspected of a criminal offence, 15–25-year-old 
Moroccan men, Rif versus non-Rif background 
Model: 1 2 3 4 5 
Descent (ref. other)      
Rif 1.074** 1.106*** 1.104*** 1.249* 1.068*** 
unknown 0.936 0.863 0.862 0.341** 0.847 
Demographic characteristics      
Age (linear)  3.056*** 2.975*** 2.977*** 3.810*** 
Age square  0.975*** 0.976*** 0.976*** 0.972*** 
Household position (ref. child or other member (not 
parent) of two-parent household) 
     
child or other member (not parent) in one-parent 
household 
 1.298*** 1.298*** 1.296*** 1.163*** 
single  1.071* 1.078* 1.076* 1.026 
married or cohabiting, childless  1.020 1.026 1.029 1.142* 
married or cohabiting, with children  1.336** 1.339** 1.342** 1.246 
other  1.232*** 1.224*** 1.222*** 1.243*** 
Level or urbanisation of current place of residence 
(ref. not very or not) 
     
very high  0.833*** 0.845*** 0.846*** 0.871** 
high  0.888* 0.889* 0.890* 0.891* 
moderate  0.876* 0.875* 0.876* 0.878* 
unknown  1.264 1.293 1.340 0.430* 
Generation (ref. 1st)      
1.5   1.570*** 1.572*** 2.428*** 
2   1.596*** 1.655*** 2.654*** 
Generation * Descent      
1.5 * rural    0.935  
2 * rural    0.871  
1.5 * unknown    3.708*  
2 * unknown    2.608*  
Socio-economic status      
Educational level (ref. high)      
low     5.468*** 
medium     3.339*** 
unknown     2.242*** 
Standardised disposable household income (ref. 75–
100% group) 
     
0–25% group     1.737*** 
25–50% group     1.496*** 
50–75% group     1.179*** 
unknown     2.717*** 
Main source of income (ref. paid job)      
social benefit     1.514*** 
pupil/student     0.935 
other     2.439*** 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.000 0.071 0.074 0.074 0.192 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 
 
 
 
